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Abstract
Call a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and 
nonrecurrent otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are 
nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. 
An assumption held in common by both sides of the debate is that a property is 
nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue 
that this assumption is false. There are a variety of kinds of separation in 
Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is relevant, we 
will see that the inseparability possessed by individual properties is neutral on the 
question whether such properties are recurrent or nonrecurrent. In particular. I’ll ; 
argue that Aristotle is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts, cannot; 
be severed from their subjects.
Call a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and nonrecurrent 
otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has 
spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. An assumption held in common by 
both sides of the debate is that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an 
individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue that this assumption is false. I’ll proceed as 
follows. In this introductory section, I’ll explain the issue and sketch the dialectic of the 
debate; then I’ll argue in more detail that both sides of the debate make this assumption; 
finally, I’ll argue against the assumption.
Aristotle’s fourfold classification of beings in the Categories—into individual 
substances, universal substances, nonsubstantial individuals and nonsubstantial 
universals—is expressed in terms of the notions of being present in a subject and being 
said of a subject: individual substances such as Callias are neither said of, nor present in, 
a subject; universal substances such as human are said of, but not present in, a subject; 
nonsubstantial universals such as color are both said of, and present in, a subject; 
nonsubstantial individuals are present in, but not said of, a subject. What sort of things 
are nonsubstantial individuals? Aristotle’s examples are a “certain item of grammatical 
knowledge” present in a soul and a “certain paleness” present in a body. But it is not clear 
from these examples whether nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent or nonrecurrent.
Can your soul and mine share the same certain item of grammatical knowledge? Can your
2body and mine share the same paleness? Nonsubstantial individuals are inherent or in a 
subject, and much of the debate on this issue has centered on the apparent definition of 
this notion at Categories la24-5:
By ‘in a subject’ I mean (lego) what is in something (tint), not as a part, and 
cannot exist separately (adunaton choris einai) from what it is in (tou en ho 
estiri)}
As I will show in more detail below, the assumption that a property is nonrecurrent if it is 
inseparable from an individual subject drives much of the dialectic of the debated reading 
of la24-5. Those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties 
read la24-5 as claiming that any nonsubstantial individual is inseparable from its subject, 
an individual substance; and those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent 
read la24-5 as only committed to the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are 
inseparable from some of the subjects in which they are found, but not from the 
individual substances in which they are found. However, the assumption that a property is 
nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject is false. There are a variety of 
kinds of separation in Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is 
relevant to a reading of la24-5, we will see that the inseparability possessed by individual 
properties entails neither that such properties are recurrent nor that they are nonrecurrent. 
In particular. I’ll argue that la24-5 is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts, 
cannot be severed from their subjects. This offers. I’m afraid, a deflationary position on 
the relevance of la24-5 to the question of nonrecurrent properties. The modest aim of the 
paper is to shift scholarly focus away from la24-5 and towards passages which might 
shed better light on the issue.
A nonrecurrence reading of la24-5
Although the view that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties was 
something of an orthodoxy before 1965, John Ackrill’s (1963: 74-5) reading of la24-5 
provides an explicit argument for the view. He interprets the passage as giving the 
following necessary and sufficient condition for inherence:
(A) X is in2 y just in case: '
(i) xis'in ,y
(ii) X is not a part of y
(iii) X cannot exist independently from y .2
As Ackrill (1963: 74) notes, (A) is circular unless we distinguish the ‘in’ in the 
definiendum from the ‘in’ in the definiens. I disambiguate with subscription. Ackrill 
suggests that (i) employs a non-technical notion of being in, writing that “Aristotle has in 
mind the occurrence in ordinary Greek of locutions like ‘heat in the water’, ‘courage in 
Socrates’.”
3Ackrill takes (A) to entail that nonsubstantial universale can not be in2 individual 
substances. He (1963: 74) writes: “Aristotle could not say that generosity is in[2] Callias 
as subject, since there could be generosity without any Callias. Only this individual 
generosity—Callias’ generosity—is in[2] Callias.” Let’s chart the moves here more 
carefully. Consider two claims:
(IEn) If X is inseparable from y, then x cannot exist independently from y;
(R) If x cannot exist independently from a subject, then x is nonrecurrent.
(A) presupposes (IEn) in translating adunaton chöris einai as “cannot exist 
independently.” Condition (iii) of (A) has the following consequence when conjoined 
with(R):
(Al) Only nonrecurrent properties can be in2 individual substances.
(Al) entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that nonsubstantial universals are 
recurrent properties, the claim that nonsubstantial universals can not be in2 individual 
substances. This is what Ackrill claims in the above quotation. This, then, is Ackrill’s 
argument for the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties: (A) is 
the correct reading of la24-5; (A) entails (Al) under the plausible assumption of (R); 
nonsubstantial individuals are in individual substances; so nonsubstantial individuals are 
nonrecurrent properties.
(Al ) is open to the objection that 2a34-b7 seems to explicitly deny the claim:
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them 
as subjects.... [CJolour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for 
were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.... So if the 
primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things 
to exist.
This passage seems to say that nonsubstantial universals are present in individual 
substances. This entails the denial of (Al) when conjoined with the thesis that universal 
properties are recurrent. Ackrill (1963: 83) denies that the passage does have this 
entailment, writing that
to say that colour is in body is to say that every instance of colour is in an 
individual body. If so, Aristotle’s present formulation is compressed and careless. 
For he does not mention individual instances of colour; he speaks as if, because 
colour is in body, colour is in an individual body. Strictly, however, it is not 
colour, but this individual instance of colour, that is in this individual body; for 
colour could exist apart from this body (though this instance of colour could not). 
Aristotle’s use of a relaxed sense of ‘in’ may be connected with his almost 
complete neglect, after [Categories] Chapter 2, of individuals in non-substance 
categories.
4Subsequent interpreters have ascribed to Aristotle not carelessness but a distinct and 
derivative sense of being in. Moravcsik (1967: 87) writes that “general attributes are 
indirectly inherent in particular substances.” Allen (1969: 35) takes a similar line, 
writing: “the ‘in’ here [in 2a34-b7] is not the technical ‘in’ of presence [i.e., of inherence: 
in2], but an ‘in’ derived from i t ... in that the first must obtain if the second is assertible.” 
Allen thus takes it that there is a third sense of ‘in’ in the Categories in addition to the 
‘in’ of the definiendum of la24-5 and the occurrences of ‘in’ in the dèfiniens: call this 
notion being in3. Allen’s reading has the advantage over Ackrill’s of not ascribing 
carelessness to Aristotle. Rather, Allen has a precise condition for a universal x to be in3 
y: just in case an instance of x is in2 y. Others have gone further. Duerlinger (1970: 185- 
6) explains 2b2-4 by successive applications of two accounts of derivative inherence. Let 
us say that A is in4 B iff A is predicated of a and a is in2 B; and that A is in5 B iff, for 
some x and some y, A is predicated of x and B is predicated of y, and x is in2 y. Then 
color is in5 body since color is predicated of a particular color and body is predicated of a 
particular body, and the particular color is in2 the particular body. Then, by the definition 
of being in4, color is in4 the particular body.
Heinaman (1981: 303) and others have been persuaded by this line of response to the 
objection to (Al). But it is an unattractive reading of 2a34-b7. For one thing, it requires 
positing at least a third sense o f ‘in’, a postulation without independent textual support. 
But worse: the reading renders 2a34-b7 unintelligible. For if the sense in which the 
nonsubstantial universal colour is in individual substances were not the sense in which 
things are claimed at 2a35 to be in the primary substances as subjects, then the claim that 
colour is in individual substances would provide no evidence for the claim that all the 
other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. 
Indeed, 2a34-b7 is entirely mysterious on this reading. If the argument is to be valid, then 
each occurrence of ‘in’ must express the same notion of being in; since the first sentence 
requires that ‘in’ expresses the notion of being in2, each occurrence o f ‘in’ must express 
the notion of being in2.3,4 Call this the problem of providing an unitary reading of ‘in’.
A first recurrence reading of la24-5
Because of this objection to (Al) and other objections,5 Owen (1965) rejects both (A) and 
Ackrill’s thesis that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties. He replaces 
Ackrill’s thesis with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are properties not predicable 
of anything less general. Individual colours, for example, are on this view not instances 
but fine-grained hues. Since nonsubstantial individuals are then not nonrecurrent 
properties but may exist in more than one subject, Owen cannot interpret la24-5 as (A); 
he rather offers the following:
(B) x is present in y just in case: there is a z such that
(i) x is in y
(ii) x is not a part of y
(iii) x cannot exist apart from z.
5(B) does not entail (Al). However, as Heinaman (1981: 296) and others note, (B) is an 
unattractive reading of la24-25: it requires that the indefinite pronoun tini and the relative 
clause tou en ho estin in la24-5 have different referents: their referents are represented in 
(B) as ‘y’ and ‘z’ respectively. Call this the coreference problem. (B) thus forces an 
unnatural reading of la24-5.6
So we have two desiderata. We would like to hold that all occurrences o f ‘in’ in 
2a34-b7 express the notion of inherence. The interpretation offered by Ackrill and his 
supporters fails to meet this desideratum. And we would like to hold that tini and tou en 
ho estin in la24-5 have the same referent. The interpretation offered by Owen and his 
supporters fails to meet this desideratum. An interpretation meeting both these desiderata 
would, all else being equal, be preferable to either the Ackrill or the Owen interpretation, 
for such an interpretation provides a natural reading of the passages.
One point of agreement among the disputants is this: adunaton choris einai is to be 
translated as ‘cannot exist apart’. I have labelled this view (IEn). Although (A) and (B) 
différas to that to which the inherent property is related, both formulations construe the 
relation as entailing an incapacity to exist independently. It is this assumption, when 
conjoined with the claim that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-5 have the same referent, 
that leads to the undesirable consequence, (Al), which seemingly conflicts with 2a34-b7. 
Ackrill and his supporters, having retained both assumptions, have been forced into an 
unnatural reading of 2a34-b7. Owen and his supporters, on the other hand, have retained 
the assumption that separation is a capacity for independent existence and, preferring the 
natural reading of 2a34-b7, have been forced to drop the claim that tini and tou en ho 
estin in la24-5 have the same referent.
These two routes are not the only means to avoid the conflict between 2a34-b7 and 
(Al ). Might we not instead retain the claim that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-5 have 
the same referent and, preferring the natural reading of 2a34-b7, reject the thesis that 
separation is a capacity for independent existence? Certainly, this is the prima facie 
evidence of the text. Under the natural reading of 2a34-b7, nonsubstantial universals 
inhere in individual substances. This entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that 
universal properties are recurrent, that certain recurrent properties inhere in individual 
substances. Generosity can exist in both Callias and Socrates, and so apart from either. 
However, given that both are generous, the property is separable from neither.
The disputants seem to have merely assumed that separation is a capacity for 
independent existence and have been thus forced into an unnatural reading—either of 
2a34-b7 or la24-5. Let us reverse the order of things. First, I advocate the natural reading 
of 2a34-b7 and la24-5.1 will avoid commitment to (Al) by rejecting the thesis that 
separation is a capacity for independent existence. If I can give an alternative :
interpretation of separation which nonetheless allows me to retain the natural reading of 
the passages, then this alone will provide some reason to prefer the alternative 
interpretation to the orthodox. But before giving my reading of this passage. I’ll rehearse 
one more wrinkle.
6A better recurrence reading of la24-5
Frede (1987: 62) offers a reading of la24-5 which avoids the coreference problem and is 
consistent with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent. He views the 
passage as committed only to the following:
(C) X is present in a subject if there is a z such that
(i) X is not a part of z
(ii) X cannot exist independently from z.
(C) offers several advantages over (A) and (B). First, (C) avoids the problem of providing 
an unitary reading of ‘in’ in la24-5—the problem which sunk (A). Recall, Ackrill needed 
to posit two senses of ‘in’ in the passage, so to distinguish the ‘in’ in the definiendum 
from the ‘in’ in the definiens. This postulation, we have seen, is difficult to reconcile with 
2a34-b7. But the right-hand side of (C) has no ‘in’ . As such, no risk of circularity is 
incurred and no conflict with 2a34-b7 arises.
A second advantage is that (C) avoids the coreference problem—the problem which 
sunk (B). Recall, the difficulty here was that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-25 ought to 
have the same referent. (C) sidesteps this problem. la24-5, on Frede’s (1987: 59) reading, 
“do not provide a definition of the relation ‘x is in y as its subject’; rather, they provide a 
definition of the class of entities that are in something as their subject.” (Italics mine.) As 
such, tini can be left unspecified.
Notice, (C) preserves the inseparability thesis: if x is inseparable from y, then x 
cannot exit apart from y, and so x is nonrecurrent with respect to the kind of subject that y 
is. The strategy of (C) is to shift the subject from which the inherent property is 
inseparable. On this reading, for an individual nonsubstance such as this color to be in, 
say, Callias only requires that the nonsubstance be inseparable from some entity—for 
example, from body. There are no bodiless colors. Part of the appeal of (C) is that, under 
Frede’s reading, la24-5 has only these weak and uncontroversial commitments.
Despite the ingenuity and attractiveness of (C), there are several reasons to reject it 
as a reading of la24-5. I’ll give two.7 First, (C) reads T mean’ (legetai) as introducing a 
merely sufficient condition for being present in a subject. Both (A) and (B), by contrast, 
take T mean” as introducing a definition of inherence. However, I find neither reading 
compelling. Rather, the most natural reading to my ear is to take T mean’ as introducing a 
clarification. Aristotle sometimes uses legein in this way.8 Moreover, a definition of 
inherence would be a little odd at thé point in the Categories in which the passage occurs. 
The notions of being said of or present in a subject are used to give an initial taxonomy of 
beings; their usefulness for this end would be mitigated were they not intuitive 
notions—or, at least, intuitive to Aristotle’s intended audience—and so not needing 
definitions. Moreover, the said of relation is left undefined: if the notion of inherence is
7being defined or if a sufficiency condition for inherence is being given, then the 
asymmetry is puzzling. So I suspect that Aristotle’s concern in la24-5 is not to define the 
present in relation but to distinguish his target notion from another sense of being in a 
subject which would also be an intuitive notion to Aristotle’s readers. This is the notion 
of being in a subject as a part is in a whole. la24-5 is merely intended to exclude this 
sense of being in a subject. This brings me to my second criticism of (C).
Notice, the two conditions, (C, i) and (C, ii), are unrelated. Indeed, there is an 
assumption held in common among all of the interpreters we have looked· at so far. 
Consider again Ackrill’s translation of la24-5:
By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist
separately from what it is in.
Let’s call the “not as a part” bit the nonmereological condition on inherence and the 
“cannot exist separately from what it is in” bit the inseparability condition. The 
translation, putting the conditions in the form of a conjunction, reinforces the view that 
these are two distinct conditions. This view is held by supporters of all of (A), (B) and 
(C). But it’s an unnatural reading of the text. The participle construction in the Greek 
suggests that the inseparability condition is an explication of the nonmereological 
condition. Recently, Daniel Devereaux (1992: 124-5) has given just such a reading of 
la24-5; and although, as I’ll explain below, I disagree with some points of Devereaux’s 
interpretation. I’m entirely sympathetic to his view that the nonmereological and 
inseparability conditions are related.
So let’s put these two claims together. la24-5 is intended to anticipate a potential 
confusion among Aristotle ’ s readers. There are several senses of being in a subject, 
including the sense in which a part is in a whole. The passage aims to clarify the target 
notion of being in a subject by excluding this mereological sense of being in a subject. 
Included in the passage is a brief explanation why the target notion is different from the 
mereological notion. Unlike the relation holding between a part and its whole, an inherent 
property is inseparable from its subject. The desideratum that the inseparability and the 
nonmereological conditions of 1 a24-5 be related suggests that the relevant notion of 
separation, the notion of separation which is denied of inherent properties, is that ascribed 
to parts. Now: what is Aristotle’s notion of mereological separation?
Mereological separation
Aristotle at least sometimes holds that parts are inseparable from wholes.9 Consider Meta. 
1040b5-8:
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only 
potentialities, e g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately 
(kechörismenon)·, and when they are separated (chöristhe), then they too exist, all 
of them, merely as matter).
δHere there seems to be two senses of separation. The occurance of chôristhë refers to 
severance.10 But what is the sense of kechörismenon? The separation denied of parts here 
must be the separation Aristotle elsewhere ascribes to substances and denies of 
nonsubstances.11 For the demonstrandum of the passage is that parts are not substances. 
This would be established if it could be shown that parts are not separable in the way in 
which substances are separable. Under the orthodox view, such separation is a capacity 
for independent existence.12' 13
Devereux argues that Aristotle initially held that the parts of substances are 
themselves substances and only rejected this view in later writings such as the 
Metaphysics. On this view, the Aristotle of the Categories holds that parts are capable of 
existence apart from their wholes. So when Aristotle claims in la24-5 that inherent 
properties lack the separation which parts possess, he is claiming that they cannot exist 
independently from that in which they inhere. The question at hand, then, is: is Devereux 
right that the Aristotle of the Categories held that parts are substances? He (1992: 120) 
cites several passages as evidence for this claim. But I find that no passage convincingly 
supports Devereux’s view. Consider 8b 15-21:
But as for a head or a hand or any such substance, it is possible to know it—what it 
itself is—definitely, without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to 
which it is spoken of. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, it is not 
necessary to know definitely. So these would not be relatives. And if they are not 
relatives it would be true to say that no substance is a relative.
Devereux takes this passage to be claiming that heads and hands are substances. But the 
passage can be read as making one of two weaker claims. It may be noting that parts are 
thought by some to be substances. The argument, on this reading, is: if parts, which are 
controversially claimed by some to be substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori things 
which are uncontroversially substances are not relatives. Alternatively, the passage might 
be claiming that a head or a hand is homonymously a substance. Of course, a body part 
has a semblance of substantiality: it is enformed matter. On this reading, the argument is: 
if parts, which are merely homonymously substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori 
things which are unequivocally substances are not relatives. At very least, we are not 
compelled to read the passage as claiming that parts are, strictly and truly speaking, 
substances.14
The issue of mereology and substance in Aristotle is too complex to cover 
adequately here. But I see no compelling reason to believe that the Aristotle of the 
Categories holds that parts are substances. Moreover, even if he did, this is a substantial 
thesis (ho pun intended)—it would serve Aristotle’s purpose at the beginning of the 
Categories better to draw not on his technical vocabulary and controversial views but on 
uncontroversial and intuitive notions, not on a claim that parts possess ontological 
independence but just on the ordinary observation that physical parts are severable.15 
This, then, strikes me as the most natural and least contentious reading of la24-5. The 
target notion of being in a subject is distinguished from the sense in which a part is in a 
whole. For, unlike physical parts, properties cannot be severed from what they are in.
9I’ll conclude. We’ve rehearsed a debate on whether or not nonsubstantial individuals 
are recurrent properties. If my reading is correct, there is the following disappointing 
consequence. The passages la24-5 and 2a34-b7 give us no reason to prefer one view over 
the other. Indeed, when the false assumption of the debate, that separation is a capacity 
for independent existence, is exposed, the debated interpretation of these passages can be 
seen as not germane to the issue. A property which inheres in an individual subject cannot 
be separated—ihat is to say, severed—from its subject: but this entails neither that the 
property is recurrent nor that it’s nonrecurrent. For neither a recurrent property—being 
pale, say—nor a nonrecurrent property—being my pale, say—can be severed from me.
So, if we are to give an account of nonsubstantial individuals in Aristotle, we need to 
look elsewhere.16*17
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might respond that parts do not exist as parts when severed. But this is only to concede that the 
inseparability of parts does not primarily concern mere existence. In my view, the claim that substances are 
separate is the claim that substances have the ontological status of beings independently of standing in a 
relation to something else. Nonsubstances, on the other hand, are inseparable from substances since they 
depend on inhering in or being said of substances for their ontological status. I argue for these claims in my 
“Ontological Independence in Aristotle”, forthcoming.
14 Consider another passage, 3a29-32: “We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say 
that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we 
spoke of things in a subject we did not rnean things belonging in something as parts.” Again, this passage 
only requires that parts are homonymously substances. The worry is that we might conclude that parts are 
in no way substances, not even homonymously, not that they are not, strictly speaking, substances. ...
Other passages cited by Devereux include 298a29-32: “As substances I class the simple bodies—fire, 
earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a 
whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts.” But this passage doesn’t classify the parts of 
plants and animals as themselves substances but contrasts organic substsances, articulated with parts, with 
the simple elemental bodies. Devereux also cites 818b5-8, but the work containing this passage is spurious.
15 Frede (1987, 61) views the nonmereological condition as denying that inherent properties are definitional 
parts. Again, I find this an overly theory laden reading, if we can provide an account which doesn’t require 
the beginning of the Categories to presuppose so much Aristotelian technology, then so much the better.
16 Indeed, the interpretation of inherence is not quite the right focus for the issue of nonsubstantial 
individuals, since the property of inhering in a subject is not unique to the class: nonsubstantial universal
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also inhere in a subject. For this reason, the relative neglect, in the literature on this issue, of Jones 1972 
and 1974 is regrettable. Jones follows Aristotle’s gloss, at lb6-7, 3bl2 and 4al0-21, on ‘individual’ as 
‘what is one in number’ to provide an account based on Meta. I. Annas (1974) raises some ‘queries’ for 
this position—Aristotle never himself offers Jones’ account of individuals and indeed seems to offer an 
alternative account at 1089b24-8—but neither of these problems are insurmountable.
17 Thanks to Sean Kelsey, Gavin Lawrence and Calvin Normore for discussion.
